PHIL-440: Advanced Seminar

Document Type

Student Paper

Publication Date

Summer 9-1-2019


Applied Ethics | Classical Literature and Philology | Classics | Epistemology | Ethics and Political Philosophy | History of Philosophy | Law and Philosophy | Literature in English, North America, Ethnic and Cultural Minority | Metaphysics | Other Classics | Other Law | Other Philosophy | Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind | Philosophy of Science

Description, Abstract, or Artist's Statement

The present text explores how the topic of head and heart is much more complicated than one would expect, according to Paul Henne and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, contributors of Neuroexistentialism. “Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality” aims at figuring out the problem of which moral judgments we can trust, judgments from one’s head (revisionism) or judgments from one’s heart (conservatism). My hypothesis suggests the opposite of the authors, I believe that if you are a revisionist, your first order intuitions are reliable. After setting the framework, I make three main arguments. (A.) If you are able to self-correct then you can identify errors and contradictions by having clear and distinct ideas. (B.) If you take doubts into account that are both fair and productive, then the uncertainty that lies in the revisionist view diminishes, and your first order intuitions are reliable. (C.) If you silence irrelevant factors in your moral reasoning process, then you are more likely to not be influenced by irrelevant factors that can distort your reasoning. Therefore, if you are a revisionist your first order intuitions are reliable. The importance of this text lies within the fact that we want to know whether or not our moral judgments are correct because if they are not, we will be more likely to misbehave. We care about doing the right things and becoming more moral. We need to show that our moral judgments stem from reliable processes, so we can know which beliefs can make reliable judgments.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License.